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1. The Issue 
Self-ascriptions of mental states and dispositions are assumed to 
have a privileged epistemic authority compared to third-party 
ascriptions. An agent does not need to check her own behavior 
in order to know that she intends to read The Karamazov 
Brothers for a while. Anyone else would have to ask her instead, 
or infer what she intends from one or another piece of evidence. 
Within the analytic tradition, the debate on self-knowledge has 
mainly been concerned with this asymmetry between the first-
person and the third-person perspectives. Traditional accounts 
seek to identify a specific epistemic ability that should account 
for the privileges of the first-person view. Following up on 
David Finkelstein, I will refer to this kind of view as 
“detectivist” 1 . There is “the old, Cartesian, detectivist view” 
according to which only the agent herself has a direct, infallible 
access to her own mental states. It has famously been objected, 
though, that the states and events of a fully private mind cannot 
coherently be identified, for there is no way in which appearance 
and reality could be distinguished within a Cartesian mind2. 
Alternatively, some philosophers have defended a naturalistic 
detectivist view (“new detectivism” in Finkelstein’s own terms) 
according to which the first-person privilege derives from the 
existence of an exclusive, inner perceptual mechanism that is 
significantly more reliable than any other perceptual 
1 Finkelstein (2003), p. 2. 
2 This has, indeed, to do, with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s argument against 
the intelligibility of a private language. See Candlish, Wrisley (2012), Kripke 
(1982), Mulhall (2007), Stroud (2000), chh. 5, 6, 13 and Wittgenstein (1953), 
parr. 243-315. 
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mechanisms3. It is unclear to me, however, whether the identity 
conditions of this inner mechanism can be fixed in a way that 
avoids the shortcomings of a private mind and, yet, preserves 
the privileges of the first-person perspective. For this 
mechanism is claimed to be highly reliable, but how is this 
condition to be established? Reliability is a fact about a certain 
mechanism and, therefore, it is subject to the contrast between 
appearance and reality that is unavailable, as we have seen, to a 
private mind. But, if a third-person perspective is required to 
determine the reliability of that inner mechanism, the 
mechanism itself must be individuated in such a way that this 
constraint could be met, and how could this be so except by 
allowing a third party to have access to the deliverances of this 
mechanism? But in what sense could we then claim that the 
deliverances of this mechanism are still specifically first-
personal? 
Both old and new detectivists assume that first-person 
authority is alien to our agential condition. There are, however, 
some other approaches to self-knowledge that exploit our 
agential capabilities to account for the epistemic privileges of 
the first-person perspective. There is, to begin with, “the 
constitutivist view” according to which first-person authority is 
to be explained by the fact that our decisions or commitments do 
constitute our mental states in a way akin to the procedure by 
which a mayor may marry two people 4 . In this context, a 
mismatch between my mental states and what I believe them to 
be can scarcely exist, since there is no distance between my 
being in such and such a mental state and my decision to be in 
that state. There is, however, an extensive dissatisfaction with 
this view. It is hard to swallow, for instance, that my head aches 
just because I decide it to, and this holds for a number of other 
mental states that are rather impervious to our decisions. Some 
sorts of psychical impairment come to confirm the relative 
3 See Armstrong (1968), Churchland (1984), Finkelstein (2003), pp. 15-
27, Lycan (1996). 
4 See Finkelstein (2003), ch. 2, Wright (2001). 
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autonomy of our psychological condition with regard to our 
decisions or beliefs. We must thus acknowledge the significance 
to our agency of the idea of “resistance” on the side of our 
psychological condition. 
Some recent approaches to self-knowledge do take this 
notion of resistance quite seriously and want their account to 
make sense of it. In fact, they associate our agency with our 
ability to shape our psychological dispositions, and judge that 
some typical psychic impairments (i.e., those that 
psychoanalytic therapy standardly address) have to do with a 
deficiency in this respect. They thus conclude that a healthy and 
flourishing agent must have significant command upon her 
dispositions. The important point for our purposes is their 
conviction that this command can be enhanced by a certain kind 
of self-awareness of one’s own psychological condition that is 
quite hard to achieve. I will refer to this approach as “the 
authority view” insofar as it exclusively focuses on the authority 
that an agent must have upon her psychological dispositions and 
excludes that self-observation could be intimate enough to 
apprehend the peculiarities of the first-person perspective, since 
an observational perspective is apparently available to a third 
party as well5. But how is this need to have practical authority 
upon one’s own psychological dispositions connected to the 
epistemic first-person privilege we were supposed to account for? 
The latter was presented as an ability that every agent does 
posses, whereas the practical authority under consideration 
emerges as a capacity that only the healthy can achieve and 
often to a limited extent. In other words, are the epistemic 
privilege of the first-person perspective and self-knowledge as a 
certain kind of practical authority really interwoven or do they 
constitute two independent phenomena? 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this issue, 
so that we get a better understanding of the privileges, 
uncertainties and blind spots that are involved in self-knowledge. 
I must confess that I feel rather dissatisfied with the way the 
5 See Dumm (2006), Moran (2001). 
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champions of the authority view have addressed this perplexity6, 
therefore I will sketch an alternative approach. For this purpose, 
I will examine how “sincerity” and “authenticity” relate to one 
another. I will firstly take advantage of Bernard Williams’ 
notions of acknowledgement and making sense and, secondly, I 
will make use of Simone Weil’s distinction between the two 
senses of obedience and the associated notion of attention. On 
this basis, I will conclude that a certain sort of self-perception 
lies at the heart of our agency and, therefore, in our capacity to 
lead a relatively authentic life. This kind of self-observation 
escapes the standard worries about a private mind but is in a 
crucial sense specifically first-personal. It does not imply, 
however, any systematic epistemic privilege on the agent’s side; 
if there is any epistemic privilege of the first-person perspective 
to be granted, it will have to do with the narrative abilities that 
we regard as constitutive of the self. The discussion as a whole 
suggests, in any event, a way in which the analytic and the 
continental traditions can fruitfully cooperate. 
 
2. Sincerity and Authenticity 
In Truth and Truthfulness 7 , Williams explores the transition 
from sincerity to authenticity. He elaborates his own view on the 
basis of two historical proposals. Firstly, there is Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s attempt to be entirely self-transparent in his 
Confessions. Rousseau assumes that no one knows him better 
than himself. According to Williams, his purpose is to reveal his 
true identity to others so that they could for once acknowledge 
his moral goodness, and assumes that sincerity would suffice to 
achieve this goal. But is sincerity really enough? Only on a 
number of rather implausible assumptions: 
 
This conception presupposes several things. It requires, as we have 
seen, the authority of self-discovery: [a] the idea that sincere, 
spontaneous, non-deceitful declaration, the product of his presence 
6 Corbí (2011a), (2011b), (2012), ch 6. 
7 Williams (2002), ch. 8. 
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to himself, will guarantee a true understanding of his motives. 
Moreover, [b] what is revealed and understood in this way will 
represent a character, a whole person, and this implies that it will 
be coherent, or, as one might say, steady. True self-revelation will 
of course reveal conflicting moods and short-term feelings [...] But 
under this there is assumed to be a real character, an underlying set 
of constant motives, in which his true self is expressed [...] [c] In 
his own case, he was sure that these motives were basically 
benevolent and well-disposed toward others. This impression is 
basic to Rousseau’s project of reassurance, the removal of distrust 
by first-personal explanation8. 
 
A number of virtues are mentioned in this passage that hardly 
belong to the notion of sincerity as such and involve a more 
complex notion, like that of authenticity because the idea of a 
motive, not to mention that of a unified self, requires a kind of 
steadiness that sincere self-declarations are unable to guarantee9. 
To highlight this point, Williams sketches a different model of 
truthfulness on the basis of Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew: «He 
[Rameau] offers an exceptionally clear example of sincerity in 
its basic form of uninhibited expression or enactment, rather 
than in the form of reporting the findings of self-examination. 
He is unguardedly spontaneous, too, in his second-order or 
reflective comments. The model of sincerity as uninhibited 
spontaneity even applies to his flattery and deceit»10. 
Sincerity as sheer spontaneity about the content of one’s self-
examination reveals a self that is not unified under a few 
motives or projects, but whimsical and variable: «Diderot was 
always attracted to a picture of the self as something constantly 
shifting and reacting and altering; as a swarm of bees, as a 
clavichord or harp or other instrument, with the wind or some 
such force playing on it»11. The model of a swarm of bees or a 
harp appears as so vulnerable to the circumstances that one must 
reasonably doubt that any such entity could be endowed with the 
8 Ivi, pp. 178-179 (sections are mine). 
9 See ivi, p. 183. 
10 Ivi, p. 189. 
11 Ivi, p. 190. 
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relevant constancy of purpose to count as a self or even to have 
mental states with a certain content at all. Williams thus 
concludes that we become a proper self by a process of 
stabilization, that is, by steadying one’s own mind: «On 
Diderot’s view, as I understand him, it is a universal truth, not 
just a special feature of modernity, that human beings have an 
inconstant mental constitution that needs to be steadied by 
society and interaction with other people»12. 
The need to steady the mind has severe implications 
regarding the way sincerity and authenticity are to be construed. 
Firstly, the model of sincerity as sheer spontaneity must be 
dropped, for this model implies that self-declarations have 
implications upon the future or the past and, therefore, scarcely 
involves any sort of commitment beyond the instant at which the 
declaration is made: «This means that the declaration at a given 
instant of self can be only a declaration of self at that instant»13. 
But, in the absence of some minimal commitment, we cannot 
make sense of the idea that an agent has made a declaration at 
all: «If what I uninhibitedly declare at a given moment can be 
taken to myself or anyone else as a declaration of something 
which I believe, that is because there is a practice that firms up 
the expression of the immediate state into something that has a 
future»14. 
Hence, we must move beyond the idea of sheer spontaneity to 
make sense of a sincere self-declaration. We need some degree 
of steadiness, but how much? As much as it is required to get a 
self, even though it falls short of the more exacting demands of 
authenticity. But, before we shift to the issue of authenticity, let 
me dwell a bit more on the implications that the need to steady 
the mind has for the idea of sincerity. As Williams suggests, it 
implies that «we must leave behind the assumption that we first 
and immediately have a transparent self-understanding»15. 
12 Ivi, p. 191. 
13 Ivi, p. 190. 
14 Ivi, p. 192. 
15 Ivi, p. 193. 
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Thus, I will argue that this challenge to the idea of 
immediacy also calls into question the view of a self-declaration 
as a sort of self-report, that is, the idea that an agent has 
immediate, direct access to some facts that she might eventually 
decide to report. To this end, let me examine the identity 
conditions of the facts an agent is supposed to report in her self-
declarations. And here I propose to resort to Williams’ 
discussion on the distinction we can draw in history between “a 
chronicle” and “a narrative”. We may be tempted to regard a 
chronicle as providing the materials, the facts, upon which one 
or another narrative can be elaborated 16. Narratives will thus 
seek to make sense of certain facts, whereas chronicles are 
supposed to merely report them. This model presupposes that 
facts are out there, ready to be reported by a chronicle or 
selected by a narrative, and, therefore, as not being shaped at all 
by the purposes of the inquiry itself, but previous to it17. We can 
certainly distinguish between a chronicle and a narrative, or 
between facts and attempts to make sense of them, but it does 
not follow that facts are not themselves the product of some 
mini-narratives, that is, of some attempts to make sense of some 
narrower sequences of events. As Williams puts it, «The model 
serves to remind us that there can be agreement on facts and 
disagreement about what makes sense of them to whom»18. 
The contrast between the facts we agree upon and a 
disagreement about what makes sense of them, does not imply 
that the former are determined regardless of any shared inquiry. 
One may feel tempted, though, to claim that history should stick 
to the facts or, in other words, to the agreed facts, giving up any 
attempt to make sense of them. For history has to do with truth 
and knowledge, and any narrative that tries to make sense of the 
agreed facts seems to go beyond what can be assessed as true or 
false. We may call this as a “minimalist” approach to history: 
 
16 See ivi, p. 239. 
17 See ivi, pp. 240, 257. 
18 Ivi, p. 240. 
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The point is that a minimalist style has to hold its own or earn its 
place against others. The ever deceptive word “really” can suggest 
that in simply telling the truth, and that anything else is not just 
fiction but falsehood. That is the error of what is often called 
“positivism”. The claim that there is no overall or large-scale sense 
to be made of the past is itself a larger-scale claim, and it has to be 
earned, like any of the others. Perhaps it can be earned, but it does 
not come as a free gift from metaphysics to history19. 
 
The minimalist approach becomes deprived of its metaphysical 
gist, however, once we acknowledge that we do not confront 
facts as such, but within the context of a narrative or an inquiry. 
It follows that the minimalist approach has to address the same 
issues concerning the relevance of their inquiry that affect more 
ambitious approaches. Hence, there no definite metaphysical 
benefit to be expected and the question is no longer whether one 
must stick to the facts and leave aside any attempt to make sense 
of them, since any narrative, minimal or otherwise, must always 
rely on making sense. The real issue for history is thus deprived 
of its metaphysical scent and reduced to the question as to what 
narrative is more appropriate to any given occasion. It may 
occur that the minimalist story should prevail on some such 
occasions, but I will sketch some reason why it cannot always 
be so. And this reason has to do with the structure itself of 
making sense as Williams elucidates it. 
Regarding the structure of making sense, two constitutive 
features are highlighted: (a) making sense is relative to an 
audience, and (b) making sense is not a matter of the will. 
Regarding the first point, «the basic idea is that it makes sense to 
a certain person (or group) that P. We can take ‘P’ as the 
story»20. We can try to make sense of a certain action in terms of 
one or another story, in terms of either P or Q, but the ability of 
either story to make sense of that action will be relative to a 
certain audience. P can make sense of this action to audience A, 
whereas failing to provide this outcome for audience B that may 
19 Ivi, p. 246. 
20 Ivi, p. 235. 
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rather prefer a different story Q. It is important to stress that 
audiences and stories are not totally alien to each other and, 
therefore, that different audiences may derive some 
enlightenment by confronting their disparate stories so that some 
sort of agreement may eventually emerge. But how is this to 
take place? Here we come to the second feature mentioned 
above: it is not a matter of the will, that is, it is not up to an 
audience to decide that a certain story makes to them: 
 
What makes sense to someone is not, in any connection, a matter 
of the will; even in a situation of decision, although the agent 
decides to do the action, he does not decide that the action, or the 
kind of action, or the considerations that support the action make 
sense to him. People can come to see, and come to see quite 
suddenly, that some course of events or someone’s reasons for 
action make sense to them, but this comes as a discovery21. 
 
Here we come to the idea of resistance that led to the idea of 
authenticity in the first place. Williams connects this resistance 
to the notion of need: «if their minds do change, and this is 
because the new interpretation better suits their needs, their 
needs do not figure as a premise in an argument»22. The phrase 
“suits their needs” invites a mere instrumental relation between 
a story and the agent’s needs, but a mere instrumental relation 
will not do. We are not contemplating a situation where a certain 
agent, say, a politician, cynically supports a certain policy just 
because it fosters her political career. This would count as a 
mere instrumental association with a certain story, but in such a 
case the most we can say is that it makes sense for this politician 
to endorse that story rather than claim that the story itself makes 
sense to her. And, yet, it is the latter sense that we want to 
apprehend, that is, a more intimate manner in which a story 
“suits” the agent’s needs. Perhaps, we can appeal here to the 
notion of “expression”: 
 
21 Ivi, pp. 261-262. 
22 Ivi, p. 262. 
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One way in which an agent’s beliefs and desires, in general his 
motivational states, make sense of his decisions and actions is that 
they can explain them. But they can explain them only because 
they are expressed in them, and that is a relation which can hold 
only between an agent’s motivational states and that agent’s 
actions. When an action presents itself to the agent as the thing to 
do, his conviction that it makes sense to do it is an expression of 
his motivational state, and this basic level of its making sense to 
him underlies the possibility that those motivational states can 
serve, in an explanatory framework, to make sense of his action to 
others o retrospectively to himself23. 
 
So, we could say that a story makes sense to an audience 
inasmuch as it expresses its motivational states. Motivational 
states and needs may not overlap; in fact, they typically don’t 
overlap, since needs are a rather objective matter that has to do 
with the survival conditions of an organism or a group. And, 
indeed, an agent can have self-destructive impulses or, more 
commonly, impulses that depart from what best could serve her 
needs. But, regarding making sense, what really matters is not so 
much an agent’s real needs but her motivational states. So, I 
suggest to stick to the latter and leave aside any appeal to a more 
objective notion of need. 
We may now go back to the dispute with minimalism and 
reply that no particular kind of story can intelligibly claim 
primacy over the rest, since the ability to make sense is relative 
to an audience and escapes the control of the will. So, there may 
be audiences best served by a minimalist story, while some 
others may need to make sense of certain facts in a different way. 
Of course, there is much to be said in each particular situation in 
favor or against any given kind of story, but we have a general 
argument to deny the overall primacy of a minimal narrative. 
Let me now explore some implications of this analysis for the 
interconnections between sincerity and authenticity. We must 
firstly give up the idea that agents do face facts that are 
determined regardless of any narrative, however minimal. For 
23 Ivi, p. 237. 
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facts, all facts, involve some minimal narrative. A consequence 
of this is that the ability to face facts goes hand in hand with the 
capacity to make sense. So, the issue becomes what kind of 
story makes sense of a certain situation, including an agent’s 
actions or experiences. Secondly, it seems that when granting an 
agent’s sincerity but challenging her authenticity, we are 
somewhat taking a similar as step as when agreeing on the facts 
but disputing how to make sense of them. This does not imply, 
however, that sincerity and authenticity are disparate, 
independent phenomena, since they both turn around the notion 
of making sense, as we have seen. Moreover, it seems that 
sincerity and authenticity are complementary notions because 
we cannot really individuate authenticity except by contrasting it 
to mere sincerity, and the other way round. So, it seems that we 
can conclude that the authority view was right in its shift toward 
self-knowledge as an achievement for there is no change of 
topic after all, but an elucidation of the ways in which sincerity 
and authenticity are interconnected. 
It is important to stress that the account of sincerity I have 
just sketched makes room for the epistemic privilege of the first 
person perspective for privilege does not require infallibility, 
since the mini-narratives that structure the facts we sincerely 
self-ascribe can also be challenged, even though it may be a 
constitutive condition of agency that such mini-narratives are 
not called into question in normal circumstances. Besides, the 
notion of authenticity opens the door to a mismatch between 
what an agent takes herself to be and what she actually is and, 
consequently, we are invited to grant a privileged access to the 
former that is denied to the latter. The possibility of this kind of 
mismatch becomes the more pregnant the more one departs from 
mini-narratives and seek to make sense of wider aspects of one’s 
own life. The issue I would like to address next is how this 
mismatch can be discerned and eventually overcome by the 
agent herself or, in other words, what kind of exercise in self-
awareness may contribute to this purpose. Here is where the 
Williams’ notion of acknowledgment comes into play, as well as 
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Weil’s distinction between two notions of obedience. I will 
conclude that a certain kind of self-perception lies at the heart of 
our agency and is, thereby, strictly first-personal, even though 
no systematic epistemic privilege can be vindicated. 
 
3. Acknowledgment and Obedience 
I have just rejected that a sincere self-declaration could 
intelligibly be construed as a report concerning a fact whose 
identity is just there to be found out, regardless of any mini-
narrative. This association of a fact to be sincerely reported with 
its integration within a pattern or mini-narrative, has a 
significant impact as to how the quest for authenticity is to be 
conceived. It implies a rejection of the primeval concept of 
authenticity according to which the agent’s reality lies just out 
there to be discovered, like a fact temporarily placed out of sight: 
 
The whole point of authenticity as a characteristically modern 
value has lain in the attempt to regain in some reflective form the 
unexpressed certainties which are supposed to have structured the 
pre-modern world. But, however authenticity is expressed as an 
ideal, it is clear that its demands will not necessarily coincide with 
the demands of anyone else, or anyone else’s authenticity24. 
 
What sort of certainty can be retained, though, once the concept 
of authenticity is anchored to the idea of making sense and the 
corresponding notion of resistance to the agent’s decisions and, 
in other words, to her will? If it can’t just be discovered, how 
else is one’s authentic self to be discerned? I regard Williams’ 
notion of “acknowledgment” as quite helpful in this respect. To 
elucidate what this notion might comprise, I will appeal to 
Williams’ own elucidation of this concept in combination with 
Weil’s distinction between two notions of obedience and her 
vindication of a concrete kind of attention. 
Williams introduces the notion of acknowledgement to 
account for the way an agent relates to, say, her national or 
religious identity. A certain agent might just discover at some 
24 Ivi, p. 183. 
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point that she is a Jew, but regard this condition as a trivial fact 
about herself as much as the color of her own eyes might be. 
After the Nazi ascent, many Jews ended up regarding 
themselves as such, but they could no longer address their 
Jewishness as a trivial fact about themselves. They had to 
“acknowledge” that their lives had been shaped by it: 
 
A relevant notion here is acknowledgement. Someone may come 
to acknowledge a certain affiliation as an identity, and this is 
neither a mere discovery nor, certainly, a mere decision. It is 
though he were forced to recognize the authority of this identity as 
giving a structure and a focus to his life and his outlook. There 
were circumstances in which what was earlier a mere recognition 
of a fact may come to compel acknowledgement, as when many 
assimilationist Jews in the 1930s came to acknowledge a Jewish 
and perhaps a Zionist identity under the thought that there was no 
way in which without evasion they could go on as though it made 
no difference that they were Jewish people25. 
 
To elaborate on the notion of acknowledgment, Williams 
appeals initially to the contrast between discovery and decision, 
but this distinction fails to provide a positive account of a kind 
of attitude that could have at the same time an epistemic and a 
practical import. The idea “being forced to” points to a more 
unified experience, though. In some previous writings, Williams 
introduced the notion of practical necessity in order to grasp a 
rather similar experience26. This sort of necessity has to do with 
a kind of motivation that the agent doesn’t experience as coming 
from within herself, that is, as depending on one or another 
desire or drive she may eventually have, but as “a confrontation” 
with something: 
 
The experience is like being confronted with something, a law that 
is part of the world in which one lives [...] It is the conclusion of 
practical necessity, no more and no less, and it seems to come 
“from outside” in the way that conclusions of practical necessity 
25 Ivi, p. 203. 
26 See Williams (1981), (1993), pp. 75-76. 
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always seem to come from outside-from deeply inside. Since 
ethical considerations are in question, the agent’s conclusions will 
not usually be solitary or unsupported, because they are part of an 
ethical life that is to an important degree shared with others27. 
 
How is the world that the agent confronts to be conceived of? 
For, quite paradoxically, Williams claims that practical necessity 
must come both from outside and from deeply inside. How is 
this sort of experience at all possible? Williams says very little 
on the positive side. He tends to insist on a number of 
dichotomies that we must skip, but these negative claims are in 
need of more positive account if we are to understand what 
practical necessity or acknowledgement actually consists of. In 
this section, I will try to make some progress in this direction by 
examining Weil’s distinction between two notions of obedience. 
Weil seeks to depart from a model of the self deeply 
entrenched in Western societies, namely, that according to 
which a truly valuable life must be ruled by reason to the 
detriment of passions. One must elucidate the principles of 
reason and then keep one’s passions at bay thanks to the effort 
of the will. The notion of authenticity in this model is confined 
to the agent’s faithfulness to the principles of reason that all 
rational agents are supposed to share, whereby the notion of 
authenticity becomes deprived of the scent of the specific to 
each particular individual, except for the many ways in which 
one may go astray. Champions of this model assume that it 
fosters morality insofar as they are convinced that the principles 
of reason include the principles of morality and also that the 
effort of the will can always prevail. Weil argues, though, that 
27 Williams (2002), pp. 190-191. In a similar way, Williams claims: «The 
recognition of practical necessity must involve an understanding at once of 
one’s own moral powers and incapacities, and of what the world permits, and 
the recognition of a limit which is neither simply external to the self, nor yet 
a product of the will, is what can lend a special authority or dignity to such 
decisions – something that can be heard in Luther’s famous saying, for 
instance, but also, from a world far removed from what Luther, Kant, or we, 
might call “duty”, in the words of Ajax before his suicide: “now I am going 
where my way must go”» (Williams 1981, pp. 130-131). 
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this last conviction rests on a poor understanding of the role of 
the will in the dynamics of the self. Once this role is properly 
elucidated, it becomes clear that an alternative model of the self 
is needed if morality is to be promoted. For this purpose, let me 
firstly challenge the privileged role traditionally ascribed to the 
effort of the will in our ability to lead a moral life and, secondly, 
sketch how an alternative model, focused on the idea of 
attention, will not only foster our ability to act morally, but our 
capacity to articulate a more authentic life. These two steps are 
somewhat present in the following passage «Action is the 
pointer of the balance. We must not touch the pointer but the 
weight. Exactly the same rule applies to opinions. If we fail to 
observe it there is either confusion or suffering»28. 
Action is what we want to transform or, more generally, the 
overall direction of our own lives. If we touch the pointer of the 
balance for this purpose, we will only temporarily alter the 
course of our actions, but once the pressure is released a 
pendular movement will take our lives back to the old track. 
Touching the pointer amounts, in Weil’s reflection, to an effort 
of the will that is thus construed as energy consuming and, 
therefore, as limited in amount and also as shallow, since it is 
unable to transform the motivational structure of the self. How 
could this transformation be induced instead? By redistributing 
the weights in the pans, one might say; but how can that be done? 
And here a cryptic remark comes up: Exactly the same rule 
applies to opinions. 
Our views are certainly not changed at will, they are the 
product of our understanding of the corresponding subject 
matter. I am forced to believe that the keyboard is on my desk as 
I type this sentence. I can’t deny it. I can’t intelligibly choose 
not to believe it. The same happens with the conclusion of a 
mathematical proof. It is imposed upon me, but it is not a kind 
of imposition that degrades me; on the contrary, by 
understanding it my life is enriched. This sort of imposition 
involves, according to Weil, a kind of obedience, namely, 
28 Weil (1963), p. 44. 
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obedience to something I confront: an order that is out there for 
me to acknowledge. The ability to obey implies a sensitivity on 
the side of the self. This opposes to the kind of imposition and 
obedience that is standardly associated with passions: they just 
come from within, they are idiosyncratic and yielding to their 
necessity degrades the self. As Weil puts it: 
 
Obedience. There are two kinds. We can obey the force of gravity 
or we can obey the relationship of things. In the first case we do 
what we are driven to by the imagination that fills up empty spaces. 
We can affix a variety of labels to it, often with a show of truth, 
including righteousness and God. If we suspend the filling up 
activity of the imagination and fix our attention on the relationship 
of things, a necessity becomes apparent which we cannot help 
obeying. Until then we have not any nothing of necessity and we 
have no sense of obedience29. 
 
Human beings seem to be subject to two sorts of orders that 
come with the corresponding notions of necessity and obedience. 
The order of gravity shapes our lives only insofar as we are prey 
to a certain epistemic distortion: we take for real what it is just a 
creature of our imagination. This confusion derives from our 
difficulty to confront a certain fact, namely, the void. Filling up 
the void with the products of our imagination is an activity we 
must refrain from if we are to honor the second sort of order, 
namely, the relations of things. We let ourselves be guided by 
the actual relations of things only insofar as we are able get rid 
of the temptation to distort them due to the laws of gravity. 
There is an obvious epistemic benefit in this attitude, but also a 
gain in agency. The order of gravity degrades the self, whereas 
an agent’s ability to act on the basis of the relations of things, 
like when accepting the result of a mathematical proof, makes of 
her the master of her life. For this connection between agency 
and faithfulness to the relations of things to be at all plausible, 
Weil must have a rather specific understanding of what is 
included within the relations of things. 
29 Ivi, p. 43. See ivi, p. 38. 
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The relations of things does not simply comprise what natural 
sciences may recognize as a fact, but must encompass the moral 
features of our actions and other evaluative features as well. But 
these features are not in the world the way particles and motion 
are. Evaluative features depend on our response to the world in a 
more interwoven manner than particles do. We cannot identify 
an action as cruel, generous or shameful except by reference to 
some emotional responses on our side 30 . There is no need, 
however, to construe these responses as completely 
idiosyncratic. It is true that they can vary from one to another 
individual, from one to another context, but they cannot 
intelligibly vary in a way that is arbitrary from a moral point of 
view. Two people can actually disagree about the legitimacy of 
the death penalty, but for their view to be at all moral their 
disagreement must be grounded on features that are 
recognizably moral. This imposes an order not only on the world 
but on the agent’s experience as well. Only those aspects of our 
experience that are shaped by this sort of narrative discipline 
must be taken into account in the way the relations of things are 
individuated31. 
We are now in a position to explicate why what comes from 
outside in our practical deliberations comes from deep inside as 
well. For we are dealing with an outside order that is 
individuated in light of our actual responses, although not all 
actual responses qualify for this purpose, only those that comply 
with a certain order. We thus get a sense of the contribution of 
the inside to the outside order, but what about its depth? An 
aspect of its depth has already been pointed out: our moods and 
whims are to be excluded, something more orderly must be 
taken into consideration. But this order needn’t be very 
profound. It may be rather stereotypical, so that the agent’s life 
is trapped within certain stereotypical practices and, therefore, 
the idea of order by itself makes little sense of what she really is 
30 See Strawson (1962), Stroud (2011), ch 4. 
31 For a detailed discussion of the concept of narrative discipline, see 
Corbí (2012), chh. 4-5. 
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or, in other words, of what counts as an authentic life for her. So, 
a notion of depth is required that goes beyond a number of 
stereotypical demands. That notion can be derived from the 
relations of things inasmuch as stereotypical demands may 
respond to an order, but trivially it is not the order that the 
relations of things impose. The stereotypical order is 
constitutively a kind of order to which our imagination, to put it 
in Weil’s terms, must have contributed to and, therefore, 
belongs to the order of gravity and fails to grasp the relations of 
things. Let me now present the order of gravity in some more 
detail, so that we can better apprehend how obedience to the 
relations of things is to be enhanced and how it contributes to 
the articulation of the outside and the deep inside that is 
constitutive of an authentic life. 
 
4. A Certain Kind of Attention 
Weil construes the order of gravity as a closed system. Like a 
physical system, it is governed by a set of laws that accounts for 
every event within that system. Human beings belong to the 
order of gravity and can’t escape it except by an alien 
intervention, namely, the grace «All the natural movements of 
the soul are controlled by laws analogous to those of physical 
gravity. Grace is the only exception»32. 
Of course, a really closed system cannot coherently admit of 
any external interference. The idea itself of grace makes no 
sense from the perspective of gravity. But, once we recognize 
that our psychic forces must be identified within a pattern or a 
mini-narrative, then we can understand how our psychological 
dispositions are permeable to changes in our narrative and, in 
this respect, the order of gravity can no longer be regarded as 
fully closed, but the product of some well-entrenched narratives 
that can, nevertheless, be modified. Room is thus made for 
interferences from outside the order of gravity and, derivatively, 
for our capacity to escape that order. But, how can this be done? 
Let me present the negative program first. 
32 Weil (1963), p. 1. 
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The order of gravity follows the logic of compensation, like 
chemical reactions searching for equilibrium: 
 
Human mechanics. Whoever suffers tries to communicate his 
suffering (either by ill-treating someone or calling forth their pity) 
in order to reduce it, and he does really reduce it in this way. In the 
case of a man in the uttermost depths, whom no one pities, who is 
without power to ill-treat anyone (if he has no child or being who 
loves him), the suffering remains within and poisons him. 
This is imperative, like gravity. How can one gain deliverance? 
How gain deliverance from a force which is like gravity?33. 
 
Time and imagination play a crucial role in the logic of 
compensation. If we cannot reasonably expect to be 
compensated at present for our efforts or our distress, we tend to 
project such a compensation upon an imaginary future. 
Religious views typically provide the most robust source of 
imaginary compensation: « We must leave on one side the 
beliefs which fill up voids and sweeten what is bitter. The belief 
in immortality. The belief in the utility of sin: etiam peccata. 
The belief in the providential ordering of events – in short the 
“consolations” which are ordinarily sought in religion»34. 
If we are to escape the order of gravity, we must renounce the 
logic of compensation and face our sorrow by avoiding any 
imaginary compensation: «Affliction in itself is not enough for 
the attainment of total detachment. Unconsoled affliction is 
necessary. There must be no consolation -no apparent 
consolation. Ineffable consolation then comes down»35. 
This is the negative program. What else can we do? How can 
one avoid seeking consolation? What kind of attention is 
33 Ivi, p. 5. 
34 Ivi, p. 13. 
35 Ivi, p. 12. Weil stresses, for instance, that militiamen in the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-39) invented stories of success to confront death: «The 
militiamen of the Spanish Testament who invented victories in order to 
endure death: an example of imagination filling up the void. Although we 
should gain nothing by the victory, we can bear to die for a cause which is 
going to triumph, nor for one which be defeated» (ivi, p. 16). 
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required? Weil is not very specific in this respect. She abounds 
in examples that point to a certain direction, but this kind of 
attention is not easy to conceptualize because it has been 
relegated in our Western cultures to the peripheral 36 . Weil 
claims, for instance, that this kind of attention has to do with a 
certain kind of “passivity”. Not the way we are passive when 
yielding to our passions, but a sort of passivity that makes room 
for “a new aspect to dawn”: «A certain way of doing a Latin 
prose, a certain way of tackling a problem in geometry (and not 
just any way) make up a system of gymnastics of the attention 
calculated to give it a greater aptitude for prayer. Method of 
understanding images, symbols, etc. Not to try to interpret them, 
but to look at them till the light suddenly dawns»37. 
We can’t make an aspect emerge at will. The effort of the 
will is useless, even counterproductive, to this end. The agent 
must expose herself to the situation and wait patiently for the 
aspect to dawn. We are thus placed in the vicinity of the 
phenomenon of aspect perception, that is, we are dealing with a 
sophisticated version of the duck-rabbit case. An agent can be 
blind with regard to a certain aspect, even though it is there to be 
seen by the right perceiver. Weil encourages us to cultivate our 
sensitivity to the moral aspects of a situation, so that our 
capacity to respond morally may be enhanced, since it is part of 
our ability to properly perceive a certain moral situation that we 
are motivate to respond in a certain way. The emergence of the 
response is part of the aspect to dawn. We are, as a result, in a 
position to renounce the effort of the will as the fundamental 
motivational force, since it calls for a compensation, and relies 
mainly on what one can’t help doing once one has properly 
perceived a moral situation: «We should do only those righteous 
actions which we cannot stop ourselves from doing, which we 
are unable not to do, but, through well directed attention, we 
36 And, yet, I have argued that our scientific practices, which are surely 
central to our world-view, rely on this kind of attention. See Corbí, Prades 
(2000), chh. 5-6, Corbí (2003), ch 9. 
37 Weil (1963), p. 109. See ivi, p. 106. 
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should always keep on increasing the number of those which we 
are unable not to do»38. 
In that case, the need for a compensation does not arise 
because one acts not for a purpose but out of certain kind of 
necessity, namely, the one that is constitutive of our ability to 
perceive the relations of things: «To act not for an object but 
from necessity. I cannot do otherwise. It is not an action but a 
sort of passivity. Inactive action»39. 
This acting from a certain kind of necessity, namely, the 
necessity that imposes itself as a result of seeing the relations of 
things, can help us to understand the sort of imposition that lies 
behind the idea of authenticity. Resistance on the side of our 
psychological dispositions was presented as a symptom or a hint 
that the agent’s decisions or projects have departed from what 
one really is. Resistance can then be construed as an invitation 
to discern, to elucidate what sort of decision or commitment 
may fit with the relations of things. This response will impose 
itself upon the agent as a result of exposing herself to the details 
and nuances of the situation and trying to dismiss any imaginary 
consolations that might prevent her from facing the void. Only 
such a response will stem from the relations of things. 
It is important to stress that, among the aspects of the 
situation to be attended to, there is the particular and subtle way 
in which the agent emotionally and bodily responds to what is 
out there. The gestalt to be formed must take into consideration 
that it is a particular agent with a specific character that must 
respond. Only a gestalt of this kind might really acknowledge 
and constitute a guide for her life. This involves, needless to say, 
a certain amount of self-examination that apparently bring us 
back to the detectivist view. Still, the notion of “self-perception” 
I am vindicating does not presuppose, contrary to what the 
detectivist claims, that there are inner facts just waiting to be 
discovered, because the aspects I am referring to form a part of a 
gestalt, that is, a certain kind of narrative, the elements of which 
38 Ivi, p. 39. 
39 Ibidem. 
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can only be determined by the way they relate to each other. The 
authority view is thereby challenged because, contrary to what it 
claims, some forms of self-perception are strictly first-personal. 
In fact, what I have argued is that such forms of self-perception 
lie at the heart of our agency: they come both from outside and 
from deep inside, even if there is room for much uncertainty, as 
we have seen40. 
 
5. To Sum up 
This paper is meant to be a contribution both to the current 
debate on self-knowledge in the analytic tradition and to a 
defense of the philosophical virtues of a closer interrelation 
between the analytics and the continentals. Regarding the latter, 
I hope to have suggested how fruitful this interrelation could be 
insofar as some distinctions in Simone Weil play a crucial role 
in my contribution to the current analytic debate on self-
knowledge. What are the main aspects of this contribution, 
though? It is clear that the traditional analytic debate on self-
knowledge has recently been enlarged to encompass issues that, 
far from emphasizing the epistemic privileges of the first-person 
perspective, highlight how self-knowledge can be a major 
achievement. In light of the interconnections between sincerity 
and authenticity, I have argued that this shift does not amount to 
a change of topic, contrary to what some might claim. The idea 
of authenticity makes room for a mismatch between what the 
agent takes herself to be and what she really is; whereas the 
notion of sincerity seems to be confined to what she takes 
herself to be. I have objected to an understanding of sincerity in 
40 Some might object that my approach takes it for granted that some 
mental states (i.e., those that are subject to a narrative discipline) have a dual 
direction of fit and, therefore, that value and fact have unduly been blended. 
There are, indeed, standard objections against this assumption that I have no 
room to address here. Let me mention, though, that the authority view, which 
I am trying to revise, has no trouble granting it as well (Dunn, 2006, ch. 2). 
Moreover, there is no reason why my previous remarks could not be 
construed as grounds for this assumption, even though they may fail to 
counteract some standard objections as they stand. 
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terms of a report and have, therefore, challenged the idea that 
agents are confronted with inner facts that are just there to be 
discovered. The idea of a mini-narrative has come into the 
picture as a rather pervasive element in the individuation of such 
facts. This has induced me to stress the importance of the notion 
of making sense and the role it plays both in sincerity and 
authenticity. Given some constitutive features of making sense 
(i.e, that it is relative to an audience and it cannot be 
experienced at will), I have argued that there is no overall 
privilege of a minimalist story and that part of what must be 
ascertained is the kind of story that is more appropriate on each 
occasion to an agent’s ability to lead an authentic life. 
I have finally addressed the issue as to how an agent may 
discern the kind of narrative that makes sense to her. For this 
purpose, I have examined two notions of obedience that Weil 
distinguishes: obedience to the order of gravity and to the 
relations of things. Contrary to what she claims, there is no need 
to conceive of the order of gravity as strictly closed, once we 
acknowledge that our psychological condition is not composed 
of facts that are there to be discovered, but presupposes the 
agents commitment to one or another mini-narrative. What kind 
of interference is then possible? How is the agent to enhance her 
ability to honor the relations of things? A kind of attention 
seems to be in order. The agent must first expose herself to some 
situations; seek to leave aside any consolations and thus wait for 
some morally relevant aspects to dawn. Attention must be paid 
not only to the outside aspects of the situation, but to how it 
affects the agent herself given her specific character. Only after 
all those aspects have been heeded, can we be motivated to act 
in a certain way and can our action be regarded as authentic, that 
is, as respectful to the relations of things. 
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Abstract 
In this paper I propose a certain account of how the epistemic 
privilege of the first-person perspective relates to a certain kind 
of authority upon oneself. I will challenge Robert Dunn’s and 
Richard Moran’s view on this subject matter, and sketch an 
alternative approach. For this purpose, I will firstly take 
advantage of Bernard Williams’ notions of acknowledgement 
and making sense and, secondly, I will make use of Simone 
Weil’s distinction between the two senses of obedience and the 
associated notion of attention. In contrast with Moran’s and 
Dunn’s view, I will conclude that a certain sort of self-
perception lies at the heart of our agency and, therefore, in our 
capacity to lead a relatively authentic life. I will argue that this 
kind of self-perception escapes the standard worries about a 
private mind but is still specifically first-personal. 
 
Keywords: Self-knowledge, Authenticity, Obedience, Williams, 
Weil 
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